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VISIONS OF CADIZ: THE
CONSTITUTION OF 1812
IN HISTORICAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT
M. C. Mirow
ABSTRACT
This chapterexamines ways the Spanish Constitution of 1812, also known
as the Constitution of Cddiz, has been viewed in historical and
constitutionalthought. The document is a liberalconstitution establishing
constitutional rights, a representative government, and a parliamentary
monarchy. It influenced ideas of American equality within the Spanish
Empire, and its traces are observed in the process of Latin American
independence. To these accepted views, one must add that the
Constitution was a lost moment in Latin American constitutional
development. By the immediate politicization of constitutionalism after
1812, the document marks the beginning of constitutionaldifficulties in
the region.

The Spanish Constitution of Cadiz of 1812 stands uncomfortably at the
crossroads of various worlds. The Constitution sought to perpetuate

monarchy just as monarchical absolutism and imperial structures were
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revealing pressure factures from enlightenment political thought and
sweeping political changes around the Atlantic. It advanced notions of
popular representation and national sovereignty in the name of a king.

While establishing a perpetual confessional Roman Catholic state, the
Constitution espoused liberal ideas and institutions including representative
electoral bodies at various levels of government, restrictions on the power of
the king, rights for the criminally accused, freedom of contract, and
individual property rights. It abolished the inquisition, seigniorial structures, Indian tribute, and forced Indian labor in America and personal
services in Spain (Rodriguez, 1998). It sought the creation of national codes
of law that would be applied equally to all in courts of general jurisdiction
without regard to individual status (Estrada, 2006). Thus, the Constitution
was an early and important text in the age of democratic revolutions when
absolutism was replaced with constitutionalism, when the king's sovereignty
was replaced with the people's sovereignty. In fact, in describing the Spanish
nation in terms of a population within geographic boundaries, the
Constitution of Cadiz has been viewed as the first formulation of the
nation-state (Artola, 2008).
The Constitution is neither wholly European nor wholly American. As
scholars unearthed the substantial American contribution to the drafting of
the document in Spain, they also revealed that American deputies developed
new sensitivities to constitutional thought and governmental structure that
were transferred to independence movements and early republics in former
colonies (Rodriguez 1978; Rodriguez, 1998). The Constitution had an
important influence on American equality within the Spanish Empire, and
its traces are observed in the process of independence in Latin America.
Recent scholarship has emphasized the global and Atlantic aspects of the
Constitution: "one cannot explain Cadiz without America, nor America
without Cadiz," writes Ivana Frasquet (Frasquet, 2008, p. 21). Another
scholar writes, "judging from the Central American experience, the Spanish
liberalism that was forged at Cadiz provided key ideological guidelines
for a program of modernization and independent existence" (Rodriguez,

1978, p. 75).
With interesting content and demonstrated influence on the history of
constitutionalism in Spain and in the world, the Constitution has been the
subject of many studies and analyses, including polemical studies by liberals

and antiliberals alike (Rodriguez,

1978). The historiography of the

Constitution in the past 50 years has been summarized well by Estrada
who sees in these works at least three "Cadices." The first group of works
addressing the Constitution, antiliberal in their tone, seeks to undermine the

Visions of Cadiz

61

legitimacy of Cadiz by underscoring its inconsistency with Spain's ancient
constitution. A second group of works emphasizes the Constitution's
Spanish and national characters without fully appreciating the geographical

scope reflected in its creation, text, and institutions. The third group
discovers special relevance in Cadiz in light of the Spanish Constitution of
1976. This group finds inspiration in Cadiz's apparent ability to combine

various territories within a single nation, an enduring constitutional and
political question in Spain (Estrada, 2006).
The liminal quality of the document and its place in the history of political
ideas make it a fascinating object of study. This chapter provides some
background on the Constitution and the ways it has contributed to
historical and constitutional thought. These general themes are (1) national
sovereignty and popular representation, (2) historical justification in the
Cadiz process, (3) liberal constitutionalism and constitutional rights, and
(4) American equality and independence. To these established visions of the
Constitution of Cadiz, I add a fifth perspective. The Constitution of Cadiz
was a lost moment in Latin American constitutional development. By its
immediate politicization in history, the stage was set for the future
politicization of constitutionalism in the region. The ways the Constitution
of Cadiz was viewed in historical and constitutional thought help explain the
path, the successes, and the challenges of Latin American constitutionalism.

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND POPULAR
REPRESENTATION
The Constitution of Cadiz was drafted during a revolution resulting from a
dynastic crisis that befell Spain. Late in 1807, Carlos IV squabbled with his
son Fernando VII over succession to the throne just as Napoleonic pressures
were bearing down on Spain. Spaniards on the peninsula and in America
considered Manuel Godoy, chief minister in Spain from 1793 to 1808, an
inexperienced upstart who expanded executive power beyond its traditional
scope. The popular perception of Godoy created further instability as his
detractors supported Fernando VII's bid for the thrown and forced Carlos
IV to abdicate. The interfamily feud was more or less insignificant in the face
of Napoleon and the presence of French forces in Spain, presumably on
their way to Portugal. France took control, and both the Spanish kings

abdicated (Rodriguez,

1978; Rodriguez, 1998). In 1808 in Bayonne,

Fernando VII passed the crown to Carlos IV who had already agreed to
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Napoleon's demands. Napoleon, in turn, designated his brother, Jose, as
king of Spain (Artola, 2008). Most, but not all, Spaniards were against the
French. Some, known as los afrancesados, thought that Jose and Paris

offered the path to a modern and secular state (Artola, 1989; Rodriguez,
1998).
Regional juntas formed in areas on the peninsula that were not occupied
and in the Americas. These juntas rejected the abdication of Fernando VII,
decided to govern in his name, and resisted France. Some provinces in Spain

summoned their consultative bodies, or the Cortes (Rodriguez, 1998).
Various proposals for a united central authority to supplement or to
supplant the regional juntas followed. The thirteenth-century collection of
laws, the Siete Partidas, which carried particular authority in setting out
Spain's unwritten constitution, provided for a regency during the incapacity
of the king. Thus, some saw the goal of the regional juntas and any central
junta as the declaration of a regent or the Council of Regency that would
govern in the name of Fernando VII. Without universal agreement on how

to proceed, the proposals of Floridablanca, head of the junta for Murcia,
carried the day, and representatives for Asturias, Arag6n, Catalufia, and
Valencia, and northern parts met in Madrid while others met about 50
kilometers to the south in Aranjuez. Representatives from eight provinces,
five cities, and Mallorca participated to create the Junta Central of the
Kingdom (Junta Central, Suprema, Gubernativa del Reino). Some represen-

tatives were excluded on the basis of their locations' historical status.
Representatives of other localities joined later, but the Junta Central's
actions in excluding some representatives and not waiting for others left
some hard feelings. The Council of Castile (the Royal Council aligned with

France) objected to the creation of the regional juntas and the Junta Central
but with little effect (Artola, 2008).
The Junta Central called for the convocation of the Cortes (representative

body) that eventually drafted and promulgated of the Constitution of Cidiz.
By the end of 1808, the Junta Central had relocated to Seville and later to
Puerto de Santa Maria, on the Bay of Cadiz, as French troops advanced
elsewhere in Spain. The Junta Central planned the gathering of the Cortes.
which would have the power to pass sovereignty to a Council of Regency.

Nonetheless, the revolutionary possibilities of the Junta Central and the
Cortes itself, once assembled, were not lost on many of the participants,
including one of Spain's great liberal thinkers, Gaspar Melchor de

Jovellanos, whose efforts often steered the activities of the Junta Central
and the resultant Cortes. In light of the Junta Central's regulations
favorable to religious institutions and property, recent scholars have
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debated the degree of the Junta's revolutionary activity (Artola, 2008).

Nonetheless, the overall sense for the Junta and the Cortes that Artola
conveys for Jovellanos is correct: "[t]he object of Jovellanos was to obtain

the revolution without violence, the old enlightenment notion of using royal
power to change society" (Artola, 2008, p. 27).
By the middle of 1809, various methods and goals for the convocation of
the Cortes were being proposed. Some thought the only permissible action
by the Cortes was to establish a council of regency. Their view was that the
Junta Central existed only to continue the unwritten constitution that
existed before the French invasion. In other words, the Junta and the Cortes
existed only to perpetuate the current state of affairs, and not to reform
legislation and, even less so, to propose a new constitution. Others sought
the Cortes to ratify projects and proposals already well advanced by the
Junta Central in the broad areas of defense, government, revenue, and

education. Still others saw the convocation of the Cortes as the moment to
draft a new constitution establishing national sovereignty and subjecting the

power of the king to the popular will. They not only saw the possibilities of
improving legislation but also of completely reforming substantive and
procedural law into new codes that were consistent with new enlightenment

principles. The goals of the Cortes were not clear even before the first deputy
arrived (Artola, 2008).
In the latter part of 1809, the Junta Central created a commission on the

Cortes. An important question for the Junta Central and the commission
was the general structure of the Cortes. To rein in the more revolutionary
ideas that might be brought by popularly elected representatives to a single
house, Jovellanos and others suggested that the Cortes should have two

houses, one composed of nobles and ecclesiastics who would serve to check
the potentially more radical popular sentiment. A bicameral structure.
however, was inconsistent with the historical unicameral structure of the
historical Cortes in Spain. The issue was debated until the moment the
Cortes sat as a unicameral body (Artola, 2008).
A second issue concerned suffrage. The Junta Central decided to include
ecclesiastical, military, and popular participation. For the popular segment,
the Junta Central selected universal male suffrage, with some notable

exceptions when viewed from today. It refrained from imposing a property
requirement, generally found in the early nineteenth century. These
decisions led to Spain's first elections law, and the Junta Central used the
Census of 1797 to include one deputy for every 50,000 individuals (Artola,
2008). The process established by the Junta Central was copied and adapted
by regional Juntas in Latin America and served as a model of representative
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elections even in the areas that chose not to align themselves with the Junta
Central. Autonomous governments in Caracas, Rio de la Plata (Argentina),

Chile, New Granada (Colombia), and New Spain (Mexico) found these
provisions useful in setting up their own elections (Rodriguez, 1998).
On January 1, 1810, letters of convocation for the Cortes were sent from
Seville. At the end of the same month, the Junta Central established the
Council of Regency to assume power pending the meeting of the Cortes and
provided for several transitional laws to expedite the functioning of the
Cortes. The Council of Spain and the Indies published a document requiring
all to recognize the sovereignty of the new Council (Artola, 2008).
Two large questions concerning representation had been brewing for

some time: what to do about deputies for America and what to do about
deputies for the occupied areas of Spain. After consultation with the
Council for Spain and the Indies, the Junta Central decided to include

American participation but had not announced procedures or the nature of
the participation. The Council of Regency took up these questions and
decided that the Americas and the occupied areas of Spain ought to be
represented. A system of selecting alternate deputies was created for areas
that were unable to conduct elections or to send deputies (Artola, 2008).
On September 24, 1810, the General and Extraordinary Cortes (Cortes
Generalesy Extraordinarias)met in the Regent's Palace in Cadiz. Twentyeight of the 102 deputies represented American interests. From the palace,
the deputies went to a nearby church where they were administered an oath.
The deputies began their sessions in a theater converted for the Cortes's use

in the Isla de Le6n. By then, there was little doubt that the purpose of their
sessions was to draft a constitution for Spain in Europe and America and
that the Cortes was in fact a constituent congress (Artola, 2008). From the
standpoint of legal historians, it is important not to forget that the activities

of the Cortes were not exclusively focused on drafting a new constitution.
Running a war in Spain and maintaining control of increasingly fractured
American possessions took pride of place (Rodriguez, 1998).
A commission on the constitution established by the Cortes drafted the
Constitution of Cidiz. The commission prepared a draft of the text and an

explanatory document (Discurso preliminar). This text was debated by the
Cortes,

approved by the deputies, and eventually

promulgated and

published by the Council of Regency on March 19, 1812 (Artola, 2008).
The Constitution established two new representative structures for
provincial and local governments, the provincial deputation and the
constitutional ayuntamiento. The gist of these two institutions was to
replace royal representatives, councils, and hereditary positions in locally
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and provincially elected bodies. The viceroyalties were abolished and their
audiencias, governing councils with broad powers, were transformed into
exclusively judicial tribunals. The provisions for the constitutional
ayuntamiento greatly increased the number of cities that could have
governing bodies incorporated into the system of national representative
institutions (Rodriguez, 1998). This change alone "revolutionized America

by dramatically expanding political participation" (Rodriguez, 1998, p. 89).
In the context of American political instability, such representative
institutions were used by insurgents and others pushing for autonomy in
the Americas (Rodriguez, 1998). Although never fully establishing active
representative participation in national government at the highest level as

contemplated by the Constitution, the successes of local-level participation
and the relative successes of provincial-level participation gave Americans a
direct experience of elective representation (Rodriguez, 1998).
Notions of popular sovereignty were well established by this time both on
the peninsula and in the Americas. Although the intellectual origins of the

Constitution are not addressed here, politicians and thinkers of the period
grew up alongside the American and French revolutions, their documents,
and the writings of thinkers who inspired these acts (De la Torre, 1976;
Estrada, 2006). They knew the US Constitution, the Declaration of the
Rights of Man, the French constitutions, and the works of Montesquieu,
Rousseau, Bentham, and the like (De la Torre & Garcia, 1976; Estrada,
2006). The deputies from the Americas shared in these sources and
perspectives (Rodriguez, 1978). Spanish sources and history also played a
part. The seeds of "popular sovereignty and representative government" can
be found not only in enlightenment thinkers but also in Hispanic thought
familiar to the deputies (Rodriguez, 1998, p. 3). These ideas were everywhere
at the time. For example, one Mexican lawyer arguing for autonomy shortly

after the creation of the Junta Central wrote:
Nowadays no one can ignore the fact that, in the present circumstances, sovereignty
resides in the people. That is what an infinite number of publications that arrive from the
Peninsula teach us. It is a well known and recognized truth. (Rodriguez, 1998, p. 72)

The exact extent of national sovereignty was still undefined, and national
sovereignty in the context of a new constitution was a particularly difficult
question. For example, the Chilean deputy Leyva argued that the provision
of the Constitution of Cadiz that prohibited the Constitution's amendment
for a period of eight years after its promulgation was, in itself, a violation of
national sovereignty because the exercise of sovereignty was always in the

nation and could not be alienated or limited. Others disagreed by noting the
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exceptional quality of a constituent congress and the political need for
constitutional stability (Estrada, 2006).
In light of the succession battles for the Spanish crown, Napoleon's
invasion, and the transfer of the kingdom to Josh Napoleon, Spaniards on
the peninsula and in the Americas asserted notions of national sovereignty

that were ultimately reflected in the Constitution of Cidiz itself. The Junta
Central, the Cortes, and the text of the Constitution of Cadiz established
representative institutions to exercise this sovereignty.

HISTORICAL JUSTIFICATION
IN THE CADIZ PROCESS
A minor detour in our trajectory of visions is called for. In keeping with the
theme of this volume, it is notable that in paving the road to a new
constitution, those involved in establishing regional and central juntas, the

Council of Regency, and the Cortes repeatedly sought to ground their
actions in past practices and legal authorities. This, of course, is not a new
trope in revolution or reform (Reid, 1993). The Constitution of Cadiz and
its reforms were, in the eyes of its drafters, justified by established legal texts.
past practice, and the historical path of Spain. These sources had been used
to construct an unwritten constitution that delineates accepted compromises
in the allocation of political power and agency for the Spanish monarchy
(Rodriguez, 1998). In the context of drafting the Constitution of Cadiz, the

use of such sources as justifications was often little more than historical
fictions, but this process of justification was seen as important. The notion
of an unwritten constitution was expanded to include particular rights
associated with America through that body of Spanish law directly
applicable to the Indies known as derecho indiano (Rodriguez, 1998).
Many individual projects and draft proposals for new constitutions made
reference to the "historical constitution of the monarchy" as a basis for their
texts (Artola, 2008, pp. 40-41). The invocation of the Siete Partidas as a
source for justifying the creation of a regency has already been mentioned.
Indeed, during the debates on drafting the constitution, one deputy
proposed that to maintain the historicity of the new document, each article
carry with it a citation to the established Spanish law it proposed to modify.
Fearing the restraint this would put on the process and substance of the
constitution, the assembly voted the proposition down, but this proposal
underscores the importance of the issue of historical justification in the
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process. Although specific citations to sources setting out the ancient
constitution were inconvenient, general statements concerning the historical
continuity of the Cortes, its activities, and the new constitution were a
required part of justifying such radical changes (Artola, 2008).
Once the Cortes had established a text of the constitution, it appointed
two important individuals in the drafting process, Arguelles and Espiga, to
prepare the Introduction (Discurso preliminar). The purpose of the

Introduction was to provide a historical justification of the text by
establishing the conformity of the new text to the established laws of Spain
(Artola, 2008). The text finished, now the only thing required was to find
some justification for it. With several telling examples, Artola has observed

that the drafters were not sensitive to the historical nature or context of their
proving texts. He writes, "To legitimate political novelties, the author of the
Introduction went to propositions taken from texts from whatever past
time, without worrying himself about the changes brought over an interval
of centuries. The election of Gothic kings is the argument to justify national

sovereignty" (Artola, 2008, pp. 59, 60). How could anything but wildly
construed historical precedent in Spain be used to justify things like

representative elections with nearly universal male suffrage, natural rights of
liberty and property, the call for uniform codes of general application, the
abolition of fueros, or the suggestion that juries be used in trials? (Artola,
2008). Although not responsible for such wide-ranging changes on a pointby-point basis, Hispanic thought had a part to play in the development of
the revolution that occurred in Spain after the French invasion (Rodriguez,
1998). Furthermore, Estrada notes that the use of history was used "more as
a unifying myth than an effective guide," and that some deputies were
willing to cast away history in favor of practical approaches within a
rationalist tradition (Estrada, 2006, pp. 401, 402). Nonetheless, historical
justification played an important role in the construction of a new
constitutional text that would be acceptable to the Cortes. It was one way
the drafters of the constitution sought to use and to make sense of the past.

LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
The path toward a new liberal constitution was well established by the time
of the first meeting of the Cortes in 1810. The documents submitted to the
Junta Central and the work of the Junta Central itself demonstrate that a new
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constitution was in the offing. Some asserted that a new constitution was the
natural product of obtaining independence from France. Those fighting to

rid the country of the occupying force wanted to know where independence
would lead. For them, the answer was a constitution reforming laws and
institutions (Artola, 2008). Jovellanos drafted and presented instructions to
the legislative junta under the Junta Central in 1809. These instructions, in
Artola's words, "included the first explicit declaration of a program that
contradicted point by point the historical constitution the author invoked:
equality of laws, political and legislative unity of the Monarchy, unity
of codes, and the abolition of personal and territorial fueros" (Artola, 2008,
p. 47). Also in 1809, others asserted that the project implicated a modern
separation of powers among legislative, executive, and judicial functions.

Indeed, separation of powers was already reflected in the creation of the
Cortes when it assumed legislative power and expressed the idea that
executive power was in the king or the Council of Regency (Artola, 2008).
The process of drafting the constitution in earnest was undertaken by the
Commission on the Constitution under the Cortes. In 1811, the Commission

elected Diego Munoz Torrero as president. A central figure in drafting the
constitution, he proposed a plan of six areas for work of the Commission.
This program included the protection of individual rights, which were
construed in liberal terms to include security, liberty, and property. The
nation was to have the obligation of protecting these essential rights (Artola,
2008). He viewed liberty as "the power to do everything that is neither
prejudicial to society nor offensive to the rights of others" (Artola, 2008,
p. 53). Property included "the fruits of one's talents, work, and industry"
(Artola, 2008, p. 53). The right to equality meant that the nation would treat

all equally both in the distribution of benefits and in the application of the
law (Artola, 2008). These rights were conferred on Spaniards, defined here

as "all free men born and resident in the dominions of Spain and their sons"
(Artola, 2008, p. 53).
Although many of his suggestions were not followed by the Commission
on the Constitution or by the Cortes, Jovellanos's suggestions set the tone.
He asserted that sovereignty first resided in the association of all men.
Monarchy was not inconsistent with this because a king could serve as the
delegated agent of the people's sovereignty. Thus, the people had supreme
power; the king had sovereign power. The people could constitutionally
limit sovereign power. In this sense, Jovellanos was an early practitioner of
the idea of constitutional monarchy (Artola, 2008).
These ideas were reflected in the final text of the Constitution as well. For
example, royal power was prohibited from impeding the convocation of the

Visions of Cddiz

69

general Cortes established under the Constitution and the king could not
suspend, dissolve, or hinder the Cortes's sessions and deliberations. Because

the Constitution was written in hopes of the return of a king, it also
contemplated that the king might want to suppress it on his return. The
Constitution created a mechanism for its enforcement under such
circumstances. A permanent disputation of the Cortes would guard its
enforcement when the Cortes was not in session and would call an
extraordinary session of the Cortes when the king hindered the government.
Thus, the Constitution of Cadiz is an early example of the legislative check
on the executive, even when the executive is the king (Artola, 2008).
Similarly, a positive obligation was placed on the nation to guarantee the
individual rights in Article 5 of the Constitution: "The Nation is obligated

to conserve and to protect by wise and just laws civil liberty, property, and
the other legitimate rights of all the individuals who make up the Nation"

(Artola, 2008, pp. 57-58).
Artola has observed that once the constitutional process in Spain was

underway, the country received an entirely new political vocabulary, not
only through reports of what was going on in the Cortes but also through

the active circulation of public pamphlets and small publications. These new
terms in public discourse included such important words as "national
sovereignty, individual rights, liberty, equality, division of powers,
constitution, legislative, [and] executive" (Artola, 2008, p. 39). Such
pamphlets were part of a broader intellectual transformation in the Spanish
peninsular and American world. In addition to pamphlets and newspapers,
cafes, tertulias (salons), learned societies, and universities provided new

avenues for new enlightenment thought and discussion (Rodriguez, 1998).
There appears to have been a comfortable majority of deputies with

liberal sentiments so that many novel propositions went through the Cortes
with little or no debate (Artola, 2008). Artola has noted, "[t]he most
surprising is that a selection of articles that today we consider most

significant for their political consequences were not the object of debate or
debate was very brief [on these articles]" (Artola, 2008, p. 64). For example.
the provisions for the convocation of the Cortes and the political guarantees
of the Constitution were passed by the Cortes with little or no debate

(Artola, 2008).
The provisions establishing courts of general application for all
Spaniards, and in effect abolishing a system of separate tribunals based
on individual status (fueros), were also passed with little or no debate.
Indeed, substituting tribunals established by the king with tribunals whose
authority and jurisdiction were defined by a constitution was a significant
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change in the administration of justice and in recognizing separation of
powers (Artola, 2008). Rodriguez summarizes the liberal achievements of
the Constitution of Cadiz well:
The Constitution of 1812 abolished seigniorial institutions, Indian tribute, and forced
labor such as the mica in South America and personal services in Spain; ended the
Inquisition, and established firm control over the Church. Freedom of the press,
although already a fact, was formally proclaimed. ... The new charter created a unitary
state with equal laws for all parts of the Spanish world. It substantially restricted the
king and entrusted the Cortes with decisive power. (Rodriguez, 1998, p. 91)

Liberal sentiments, however, might go too far and be checked by more

moderate elements; a proposed constitutional article that would have given
the Cortes the power to adopt "the most convenient form of government"
was rejected because of the implicit power to reject monarchy and to adopt a

republic (Artola, 2008, p. 65). Similarly, although all Spaniards were to be
treated equally in tribunals, two articles of the Constitution dealing with the
administration of justice continued the fueros for ecclesiastics and the
military. Thus, the liberal goal of equality in the administration of justice

was tempered by the political realities of privileged status for the church and
the military (Artola, 2008).
Also living side by side with liberal constitutionalism were provisions
maintaining a privileged status for Roman Catholicism (Artola, 2008). In

fact, the original draft of the provisions providing for Roman Catholicism
did not go far enough in the views of the Cortes, which required further
drafting to include the second sentence of the following provision:
The religion of the Spanish Nation is and always will be the Catholic, apostolic, Roman,
single true [religion]. The Nation protects it with wise and just laws, and prohibits the
exercise of any other [religion]. (Art. 12. Artola, 2008, p. 80)

Thus, liberal reforms in the Spanish monarchy were not necessarily linked
to anticlericalism or freedom of religious belief. This was to be expected, as
was the continuation of the ecclesiastical fuero, once we are reminded that
"the largest group of deputies at Cadiz consisted of clergymen" (Rodriguez,
1978, p. 76). The preference for clergy as elected deputies continued in the
Cortes under the Constitution (Rodriguez, 1978).

Women suffered a setback through the Constitution of Cadiz. Under
some earlier Spanish practices, when a woman served as the head of a
household, she was entitled to cast a vote. The Constitution's clear
statement of exclusively male suffrage removed this traditional right.
Regular, but not secular, clerics were also deprived a vote (Rodriguez,
1998). Thus, the liberalism expressed in the Constitution of Cadiz was a
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form of liberalism unique to Spain at the time, a liberalism that was
Catholic, monarchic, and nationalistic in flavor (Estrada, 2006).

AMERICAN EQUALITY AND INDEPENDENCE
American representation at the Cortes presented many issues. Americans
challenged the composition of the assembly and often set the agenda for the

activities of the Cortes. In determining proper methods of representation of
the Americas, numerous fundamental questions were presented to the Junta
Central, its Commission on the Cortes, and the Council of Regency. These
included the status of individuals of Spanish ancestry born in the Americas,
the status of indigenous populations for the purpose of popular representation, and the status of people of African descent, particularly slaves who had
been forced into labor in America. The resolution of these issues had
tremendous political consequences for the Cortes, for the representative

quality of the assembly, and for its final product, the Constitution of Cadiz.
When the Cortes met, republican revolutions had already been successful

in the United States and Haiti, and the French Revolution was in recent
memory. Several nascent autonomous and independence movements had
sprouted up in Spanish America. In light of these events, America could not
be ignored. Even Jose Bonapart and the Constitution of Bayonne were
careful to take account of American interests in efforts to gain their support
(Estrada, 2006). America also provided significant financial backing for the
war against France (Rodriguez, 1978). Looking from Europe to America,
the Cortes and the Constitution had to work with and consider well
American demands.
Looking from America to Europe, we find similar influences. In an
important work addressing Latin American independence, Jaime E.
Rodriguez emphasizes the centrality of peninsular events in American
independence. He writes, "the independence of Spanish America did not
constitute an anti-colonial movement, as many assert, but formed part of
both the revolution within the Spanish world and the dissolution of the
Spanish Monarchy" (Rodriguez, 1998, p. 1). This dissolution provided some
Americans the opportunity to press for local control and autonomy, often in
the name of the Spanish king. Former interpretations that peninsular
instability provided an easy excuse for independence in America have been
replaced with a more complex narrative of interaction and reciprocal
influences (Estrada, 2006).
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A viceroy in New Spain, initially appointed by the king, for example,
might seek the approval of local institutions, such as a city's town council
(ayuntamiento), to continue in power. When local bodies pressed for greater
autonomy, they were countered by peninsular representative and neighboring viceroys who continued to assert the royal authority of an absent king.
There were also some individuals around with truly revolutionary spirits,
such as Francisco de Miranda in Venezuela, who twice attempted to
establish an independent country with British help in 1806. Although these

efforts failed, as the Spanish crown was being placed in French hands,
perhaps the moment for independence was ripe. Similarly, the eventual
success of Buenos Aires repelling British forces in 1806 and 1807 added to its
regional sense of self-sufficiency and de facto autonomy (Rodriguez, 1998).
Considering the question of American representation in Spanish
institutions of the period, it is important to remember that the issue arose
in distinct phases during the period from 1808, when Fernando VII

abdicated, to 1814, when Fernando VII abolished the Cortes of Cadiz, its
acts, and the Constitution of Cadiz (Rodriguez, 1998). First, there is the
question of American representation in the Junta Central. Second, there is

the question of American representation in the Cortes General and
Extraordinary of Cadiz. Third, there is the

question of American

representation in the General Cortes as convened under the provisions of
the Constitution of Cadiz. To these, we may add a fourth phase when

American interests unsuccessfully attempted to renegotiate their representative allotment as the Cortes were established again in Madrid in 1821.
Although these issues were similar and related, the results at each stage
reflected particular political compromises and accomplishments of various
competing political factions.

Once the Junta Central was established on the peninsula, American
representation in the Junta Central was an issue for debate and compromise.
Americans gained, but were disappointed. The Junta Central was aware that
French authorities were soliciting American support and could not ignore
the Americas. The junta also knew of American financial support of the war
effort. Thus, in the beginning of 1809, the Junta Central requested
representatives from the viceroyalties and captaincies general, through an
intricate electoral process. In total, 10 slots on the Junta Central were
allotted to the Americas and Philippines. The American allotment of
deputies to the Junta Central was smaller than what Americans would have
wanted and some important cities were excluded in the process, but calling
for American deputies to the Junta Central made an important step in their
representation. Indeed, it appears that lack of knowledge on the part of the
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Junta Central led to greater representation than peninsulars had contemplated (Rodriguez, 1998). Nonetheless, the significance of the moment
should not be lost; as Rodriguez writes, "[t]he 1809 elections constituted a

profound step forward in the formation of modern representative
government for the entire Spanish Nation" (Rodriguez, 1998, p. 61). The

effect was felt in the Americas, where, for example, in Central America,
this process provided

a "rewarding

electoral experience" (Rodriguez.

1978, p. 42).
After these elections, the spectre of autonomy continued. Indeed, regions
that were somewhat neglected in the process of sending deputies to the Junta
Central, like Upper Peru and Quito, responded with bids for greater
autonomy. Chuquisaca (today Sucre), La Paz, Quito, Santa Fe (today
Bogota), and several cities in Mexico, notably Valladolid, made varying
attempts at splitting from peninsular control, although still in the name of
Fernando VII. Similar home rule movements also continued in 1810 in
various regions of the Americas, and civil wars began to sprout in the region

(Rodriguez, 1998).
For the General and Extraordinary Cortes, 30 slots were allocated to the
Americas, with the greatest representation given to the important
administrative and commercial centers of Mexico, with seven deputies, and

Lima, with five deputies. A desire to get things underway led to the election
of substitute deputies from Americans in Cadiz pending the arrival of the
elected deputies from the Americas. These substitute deputies were
challenged by some American institutions because they were not elected in
the required manner. As proprietary deputies arrived from the Americas,
some substitute deputies shifted to other substitute slots that were still not

filled. Despite the political instability and insurgencies in some areas of the
Americas, most areas were able to elect deputies (Rodriguez, 1998).
Americans in the General and Extraordinary Cortes pushed for greater

representation in the body. Deputies sought additional representatives in
accordance with peninsular representatives, a formula of one deputy per
50,000 inhabitants. Americans claimed inhabitants included both castas and
Indians (Rodriguez, 1998). "In the Cidiz context, a Casta was anyone with
an African trace in his background" (Rodriguez, 1978, p. 54). Debate on the
topic was moved to a secret session with the result that Indians, but not
castas, would be counted. Nonetheless, in this context, the result was moot;
the proposal for American representation based on population was voted
down by the assembly (Rodriguez, 1998).
Although the status of indigenous populations did not come up in the
selection of representatives in the Junta Central and proved to be of no
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consequence in the push for American representation by population in the

General and Extraordinary Cortes, it did come up in the context of electing
deputies to the General and Extraordinary Cortes. The electoral decree
required that deputies be natives of the province, and this provision, if read
literally, would exclude peninsular Spaniards living in the Americas from
consideration. A modification of the decree in 1810 included not only
Spaniards born in America, "but also those domiciled and resident in those
countries as well as Indians and the sons of Spaniards and Indians" as

eligible for election (Rodriguez, 1998, pp. 81-82). As Rodriguez points out,
"Indians and mestizos could vote and were eligible to be selected as
deputies" (Rodriguez, 1998, p. 82). Indeed, this status was carried through
to the Constitution of Cadiz itself, which made Indians and mestizos citizens
of the Spanish nation. There are some reports that this characterization
produced difficulties in implementation in the Americas where some officials
were skeptical of the new status for indigenous people who worked as

domestics or who lived in indigenous settings and conditions. It also
provided Indians, now citizens, with solid legal authority to attack levies of

money and work or social constraints imposed on indigenous individuals
(Rodriguez, 1998). In fact, these provisions were successfully used by
indigenous populations in the 1820s to assert that personal contributions of
labor were against to the Constitution (Frasquet, 2008).
The inclusion of America also led to the Cortes establishing racial
categories that perhaps ran contrary to some of its liberal aspirations. In
1810, as a product of declaring that Spaniards "originating from the said
European dominions or beyond the seas are equal in rights to those of this

peninsula" for the purpose of national representation, the Cortes, by
implication, excluded everyone else who might have been considered to have

equal rights (Artola, 2008).
Just as European Spaniards saw the necessity of developing a system of
popular representation that did not lead to an American majority at the
Cortes, the Commission on the Constitution was faced with the same
problem in drafting the provisions for the permanent Cortes under the
Constitution of Cidiz. In their view, the key was to omit castas from the
general male suffrage and from population counts for representation

established under liberal constitutional principles. In keeping with earlier
proposals, the population for the purpose of representation was limited to
naturals who have their origins in both branches of their families in the
Spanish dominions (Artola, 2008). Thus, in addition to determining
eligibility for voting, the status of the American population surfaced again
in the constitutional text describing the method for calculating population
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for proportional representation. The Constitution made a distinction
between citizens and natural-born individuals. Article 29 states that for
the purpose of proportional representation in the general Cortes contemplated by the Constitution, the base is "[t]he population made up of naturalborn individuals who by both branches take their origin from the Spanish
dominions" (Artola, 2008, p. 67). In Europe, "naturals" included women
and children who were not entitled to vote. In America, did "naturals"
include those of Spanish origins with some African lineage, castas? And
might this include slaves? (Artola, 2008; Estrada, 2006).
One document circulated by the Consulate of Mexico vehemently
opposed including Indians and castas by asserting contemporary racist
arguments of their inferiority when compared to Europeans. The reading
of the document prompted American deputies to depart the assembly as
a whole, but they were forced to stay by the president and guards of
the Cortes (Rodriguez, 1998). The political compromises concerning the

status of individuals of African descent were eventually reflected in the
Constitution. Article 18, addressing citizenship, states:
Citizens are Spaniards who by both branches take their origin from the Spanish
dominions of both hemispheres, and are resident in any city of the same dominions.
(Art. 18, Artola, 2008, p. 80.)

By a negative inference created in the text of Article 22, slaves and others of
African descent were excluded from citizenship:
Spaniards who by whichever branch are in fact and reputedly by origin of Africa,
the door remains open to them to the virtue and benefits to be citizens . .. (Artola,
2008, p. 81)

Slaves and castas, then, were Spaniards, but not citizens. It was in this

context that Chilean deputy Leyva questioned the wisdom of the prohibition
on amending the Constitution for eight years (Estrada, 2006). To him, an
unjust provision was made even worse by fixing it into the constitutional

structure for eight years.
How did the institution of slavery in itself survive the liberal aspirations of
the Cortes? Did not the broader constitutional notions of "liberty" reflect in
the thought of the deputies and the text of the Constitution extend to the

abolition of slavery? Some regional Juntas, like the Junta of Caracas, had
voted to abolish the slave trade (Rodriguez, 1998). For the Spanish nation,
slavery continued. Proposals were made for the immediate or for the
gradual abolition of slavery or the slave trade, but American deputies who
represented areas highly dependent on slave labor were successful in arguing
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against them. To maintain union within the Spanish monarchy, even those
opposed to slavery on moral grounds voted in favor of slavery to keep the
Americas within the nation. In the end, Indians were citizens, but castas had
to go through an extraordinary process to obtain this right (Rodriguez,
1998). Slavery continued. Furthermore, castas were excluded from
participation in local government as well (Rodriguez, 1978). Note, however,
that in the concomitant battles for independence and autonomous rule in
the regions of Latin America, mixed-race individuals, free blacks, and slaves
were often decidedly in favor of the monarchy, precisely because of the
perceived gains under Spain or promises made by Spain in return for
support. Furthermore, despite the serious flaws of racism and slavery, it
must be remembered that with regard to suffrage, the Constitution of Cadiz,
as it did not limit the franchise to only literate or only propertied males, was
more progressive than any other constitutional scheme in existence at that

time (Rodriguez, 1998).
The Cortes had other effects in America. Even in areas of the Americas
that established their own juntas and exercised sovereignty apart from the
Junta Central, the proceedings of the Cortes and the text of the Constitution
of Cadiz served as models. The use of the electoral provisions called by the
Junta Central as a model for regional American congresses has already been
noted. The influence of the Cortes also can be found in the substantive
provisions of new governments in the Americas. For example, such a regime
in Rio de ]a Plata (today Argentina) "expanded education, restricted the

slave trade, abolished tribute, and recognized the political rights of
the Indians" (Rodriguez, 1998, p. 128). A subsequent general assembly in
the region undertook similar reforms. Similar influences are observed in the

reforms in Chile in the same period. Likewise, the autonomous Solemn Pact
of Association of Quito had many similarities to the Constitution of Cadiz.
Mexico's Constitution of Apatzingin, promulgated on October 22, 1814,
too shares much in common with the provisions of the Constitution of

Cadiz (Rodriguez, 1998).
The structure created by the Constitution of Cadiz did not last long.
A general Cortes under the provisions of the Constitution was called and
held in 1813 with deputies (and substitute deputies) representing much of
the nation. A second regular session was started on March 1, 1814, and the
French forces had been beaten. In April, 1814, Fernando VII received word

from the army that it would support his abolition of the Constitution.
Military support, coupled with some popular support for his absolute and
unconditioned rule without being bound by the Constitution, led Fernando
VII to abolish the Cortes and all its acts on May 4, 1814. Some Spaniards

Visions of Cddiz

77

voluntarily destroyed symbols and monuments to the Constitution. With
a royal word, the work of the Cortes and the Constitution was swept
away and those involved were implicated in treason against the king

(Rodriguez, 1998).
In America, there was little difficulty dismantling constitutional structures

that had only been in effect for less than two years. Indeed, factional
civil wars had already begun to divide portions of America. Bolivar decreed
a war of independence until death on June 15, 1813. Chile experienced its
Patria Vieja from 1810 to 1814 with an autonomous government, until
by treaty, it recognized the Council of Regency and the Constitution
of Cadiz in May, 1814, the same month the Constitution was abolished.
New Granada (today Colombia) experienced its PatriaBoba from 1810 to
1816, when it was subdued by Spanish forces. New Spain (today Mexico)
had several movements for autonomous rule in their period as well,
including the Hidalgo and Morelos insurgencies. These autonomous

movements were effectively crushed by Spain after the restoration of
Fernando VII and the abolition of the Cortes and the Constitution of Cidiz

(Rodriguez, 1998).
Nonetheless, calls for the restoration of the Constitution formed an
important part of independence discourse in America (Rodriguez, 1998).
For example, its spirit and provisions were an important part of Iturbide's

Plan of Iguala of 1821 for the independence of Mexico (Rodriguez, 1998;
Frasquet, 2008). Although in some aspects, such as counting castas as

citizens, the Plan went significantly farther than the Constitution (Frasquet,
2008).
As quickly as the Constitution of Cadiz popped out of existence in 1814, it
popped back into force in Spain and in royally controlled parts of America
on January 1, 1820, when peninsular liberals joined with the Spanish army
to insist on its restoration (Rodriguez, 1998). Several important urban

centers quickly followed the call, and Fernando VII created a provisional
junta to carry out the reconstitutionalization of the monarchy (Frasquet,
2008). The procedures of electing deputies to the Cortes under the
Constitution were reestablished, and supplemental deputies were appointed
for the parts of America under royal control, pending the arrival of the
elected deputies, who arrived in the first part of 1821 (Rodriguez, 1998). By
this time, "Rio de la Plata, Chile, and parts of Venezuela and New
Granada" were already effectively independent and did not participate
(Rodriguez, 1998, p. 197). Other areas like New Spain (Mexico),
Guatemala, Cuba, and Puerto Rico had significant participation in elections
under the Constitution. The provisions of the Constitution were imposed on
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Peru by royal authorities after militarily retaking control in 1820. Similarly,
areas of Colombia under royal control were subject to the Constitution of

Cadiz in 1820 (Rodriguez, 1998).
As in the Cortes of Cadiz, a main issue of the Cortes of Madrid, held
under the Constitution of Cadiz in the early 1820s, was the representation of
America. Only 30 substitute deputies were permitted to represent America,
and American deputies pushed for popular representation under the
Constitution that provided for a deputy for every 70,000 individuals, a
formula that would have given American deputies the majority in the Cortes

of Madrid. Frasquet has noted that these issues were not only heatedly
debated in Madrid but also in New Spain through the popular press. Thus,

the issue was not just a question for the Cortes itself but for the entire
population of the Spanish nation. Other issues of similar import, such as the

expansion of the number of provincial disputations and the specifics of
American administration and government, were also closely followed and
discussed in America (Frasquet, 2008).
Royalist areas of America participating in the Cortes generally hoped for

some form of constitutional reconciliation and the construction of
independent kingdoms with more autonomy under the king or his
appointee, but the various proposals were rejected by the peninsular
Spaniards (Frasquet, 2008; Rodriguez, 1998). These proposals would have
meant relative autonomy for the areas of Mexico (governed from Mexico
City), New Granada-Venezuela (governed from Santa Fe), and Peru-Rio
Plata-Chile (governed from Lima) (Estrada, 2006). Importantly, several
proposals presented the spectre of federalism to the Cortes (Frasquet, 2008).
American participation in the Cortes in 1822 faded because the hopes of
radically restructuring the relationship between the Americas and the

peninsula were not fulfilled by the Cortes because it was dominated by
peninsulars. The legitimacy of supplemental deputies from the Americas and

deputies representing areas that had declared independence was called into
question, and by the beginning of the ordinary session in 1823, only Cuba,
the Philippines, and Puerto Rico continued to have deputies present
(Frasquet, 2008). Again, there was little hope for a lasting constitutional
regime, even on the peninsula. In April 1823, France invaded Spain and

supported the absolute rule of Fernando VII, who, yet again, abolished the
Cortes and the Constitution of Cadiz and pursued the liberals who had

supported them (Rodriguez, 1998).
In broader aspects, several areas of the Americas were profoundly
influenced by the Constitution, the Cortes, and their political legacy. For

example, Central America was closely tied to the activities in Cadiz and
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Madrid and the implementation of their provisions in America. Guatemala's early independence is impressed with the stamp of Cadiz, and the
influence of Cadiz directly, or indirectly through Mexican pressures and, at

times, control, has been well documented (Rodriguez, 1978). Nonetheless.
this chapter examines the Mexican experience as perhaps the best example
of continuity of the ideas of and, at times, the text of the Constitution of

Cadiz into a newly independent country of Latin America. Mexican
independence is, in fact, tied to the Cortes of Cidiz and Cortes of Madrid
held under the Constitution of Cidiz (Frasquet, 2008).

Mexico under the Cortes of Cadiz in the early years did not experience
significant implementation of the Cortes' orders. The Council of Regency
appointed Francisco Xavier Venegas viceroy of New Spain in 1810.
Although Venegas published the decrees of the Cortes, he did little to
implement them and governed according to the older notions of a viceroy.

rather than being guided by Cortes and the Constitution. Liberty of the
press was suspended shortly after the Constitution was promulgated, and
Venegas was sanctioned by a body of the Cortes (Estrada, 2006). Estrada

characterizes Venegas's compliance with the election provisions of the
Constitution as having been "considerably lax," and when criollos were
elected instead of peninsulars, Venegas invalidated the election. After
Venegas's replacement in 1813, Felix Maria Calleja y del Rey sought to
enforce the Constitution on a broader basis to control the region. New

elections produced criollos winners, but claiming lack of funds, Calleja sent
only two to Cidiz. He also sought to limit the liberty of the press and was

supported by Cidiz in these efforts. He assumed the traditional powers of a
viceroy, as the king's representative, and would not be bound by the

Constitution. The audiencia complained of Calleja's breach of the
Constitution, but the question was mooted by the return of Fernando VII
to Spain and the revocation of the Constitution. This was not a promising

start to constitutional monarchy under a new constitution and, in some
circles, led to greater independence sentiment (Estrada, 2006).
The return of the Constitution in 1820 provided a moment of substantial
popular participation in constitutional government for Mexico and practical
experience in running representative institutions within a nation-state
(Frasquet, 2008). The activities of the Cortes of Cidiz and Cortes of

Madrid coupled with the text of the Constitution of Cidiz formed central
reference points for Mexican independence under Augustin Iturbide, and
Frasquet supports her claim well that "[t]he Constitution of 1812 and its

laws were the legislative and liberal reference for the Mexican deputies in the
construction of their own nation state" (Frasquet, 2008, p. 199).
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Individuals who participated in peninsular activities brought their
knowledge to the Mexican government. Under Agustin Iturbide's Plan
of Iguala, Mexico would have the three guaranties of Catholicism, national
union, and a constitution promulgated under Mexican Cortes. By treaty,
subsequently rejected by the Cortes, however, Iturbide was permitted to rule
with the Constitution of Cadiz in effect until a new constitution was
promulgated (Estrada, 2006). The Plan also contemplated a junta created in
Mexico, pending the creation of the Cortes in Mexico, which was charged
with the same duties as the Cortes under the Constitution of Cadiz.
Independent Mexico contemplated following the legislation of the
peninsular Cortes, and Mexican electoral process, although quite different
in the end, was guided by the Cadiz experience (Frasquet, 2008). Early
contentious issues for the newly established Mexican Cortes included the
status of regular clerics, the Jesuits, the ecclesiastical fuero, and the
establishment of courts and appointment of judges in the country (Estrada,
2006; Frasquet, 2008). Questions of sovereignty, taxation, the abolition of
entails (mayorazgos), the election and powers of the Council of State, and
the power of the emperor were all debated in light of the Constitution and
were often settled by the Constitution and the laws of the Cortes of Cadiz

and Cortes of Madrid. Deputies even debated what to do when recent
Mexican legislation conflicted with a provision in the Constitution of Cidiz,
a constitution they had sworn to uphold (Frasquet, 2008).
This question came to a head with the pending appointment of judges
of the Supreme Court of Justice in 1822. The Constitution made it clear
that the king, or here Iturbide as emperor, was to appoint the judges.
A committee of the Mexican Congress, asserting that it was not necessary to
"submit itself slavishly to . . . the constitution," claimed the power of
appointment for itself (Frasquet, 2008, p. 205). Mexicans debated the

supremacy of the Constitution of Cidiz in relation to the national
sovereignty held by Congress. Many argued that because the Congress was
a constituent congress charged with drafting a new constitution, it also had
the power to abrogate a provision of the Constitution of Cadiz. The more
liberal elements sought this power because it would provide Congress with
greater powers to reform government, while, in an odd twist, more moderate
deputies maintained that the Constitution of Cidiz was unalterable until a
new constitution was promulgated. Politics won the day, and in the end, the
Congress voted to make the appointment (Frasquet, 2008).
Subjecting the constitution to modification by a congress (although a
constituent congress) was bad historical precedent for the supremacy of
constitutional law over general legislative acts. It was also, at the time, bad
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politics. On the heals of this congressional action, Iturbide began a process
of dissolving Congress. His actions included the imprisonment of deputies,
bringing congressional action to a near standstill. Iturbide then acquiesced
in Congress's assertion of the power to appoint judges but added a provision
that from then on the Constitution of Cadiz was to control without
variation. Iturbide, through his Council of State, created a new military
tribunal for conspiracy against the state, where the protection of
Constitution of Cadiz did not apply. The Congress was then dissolved on

October 1, 1822 (Frasquet, 2008).
In the following year, General Santa Anna pressed for a republic and
notions of federalism challenged Iturbide and the Junta Nacional he created
to replace Congress. The Constitution of Cadiz continued to serve as a
constitutional reference point both for Santa Anna and states asserting
greater autonomy. Iturbide abdicated in March 1823 (Frasquet, 2008).
The Constitution continued to shape the debate about government

structure and function in Mexico until 1824. A reconvened Congress now set
its task as creating a provisional ruling document (Reglamiento provisional
politico). With Iturbide gone, the treaty that led to his and the country's
oath to uphold the Constitution of Cadiz was also gone. Although most
deputies in 1822 continued to view the Constitution of Cadiz as Mexico's
fundamental law, others began to distinguish the Mexican situation and
characterized the Constitution as "foreign" (Frasquet, 2008, pp. 234, 237).
This criticism continued under the reconvened Congress. The official
recognition of the Constitution of Cadiz as the constitution of Mexico was
implicitly revoked in the Reglamento, which asserted complete Mexican
independence and liberty from other laws. The Constitution, however,
continued to be a useful reference point; it was now part of Mexico's
constitutional legal culture. For example, its provisions and laws from the
Cortes of Cadiz and Cortes of Madrid informed appropriate procedures in
electing a new Congress, for creating new tribunals, and for abolishing
entails (mayorazgos). It was argued that these provisions continued to have
force in 1823 while the federalist constitution of 1824 was being drafted
(Frasquet, 2008). Again, the Constitution of Cadiz was one of the primary
sources for the drafters of the Constitution of 1824 (De la Torre & Garcia,
1976). For example, important American deputies in the Spanish Cortes,
Guridi y Alcocer and Ramos Arizpe of Mexico, were later to be
instrumental in incorporating provisions from their peninsular drafting
into the Mexican Constitution of 1824 (Rodriguez, 1998). Even the
federalism of Mexico expressed in its Constitution of 1824 found its roots
in the petitions of Mexican deputies in Spain (Frasquet, 2008).
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POLITICIZATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
TEXTS AND PROCESSES
The path of Latin American constitutionalism has had more than its fair
share of difficulties. Many recent events demonstrate promise for the
development of meaningful democratic constitutionalism. The region has
seen more peaceful transitions of democratically elected presidents. The

region has witnessed an increase in the creation of constitutional tribunals
that are accorded respect and enforcement. And in some countries, for
example, Argentina. Colombia, and Mexico, supreme courts or constitutional courts have become important political actors (Sagiies, 2009; Schor,
2009). There has also been changing popular conceptions of human and
constitutional rights with an increased involvement of regional international
institutions and legal provisions (McKinley, 2006; Oquendo, 2008; Sagues,
2009). There is promise in the region.
Nonetheless, the region still claims a litany of challenges in the realm of
constitutions, constitutional law, and the protection of constitutional rights.
These include a history of short-lived constitutions and rapid turnover of

constitutional texts, periods of autocratic authoritarianism in the executive,
and armed intervention in the political and constitutional process (Nogueira
Alcali, 2009c). The region continues to experience related and resulting
challenges with political instability, corruption, abuse of power, and a
perceived disregard for the rule of law (Carpizo, 2009). Political parties are
often viewed as prime actors in these activities (Reinaldo, 2009; Rivera.

2009).
These challenges are not new to the region, but rather are the product of
each nation's constitutional and legal development. While regional general-

izations are subject to dangerous inaccuracies, some broader trends can be
noted. Tracing the historiography of Latin American constitutionalism is
beyond the scope of this chapter, and indeed scholars have observed that no
full study has been undertaken. Bravo Lira suggests that the region's
constitutional history may be divided into three stages: (1) a parliamentary
stage from approximately 1810 to 1850 during which countries attempted
to establish representative legislatures under characteristically strong
presidents, (2) a political party stage from approximately 1850 to 1920
during which parliaments were subject to the control of party politics, and
(3) a parliamentary crisis and monocratic stage beginning in 1920 during

which parliaments fall into decadence and the executive governs through
decree (Bravo, 1992). This is, of course, only one scholar's approach and
it has its conceptual difficulties, among them how to overlay military
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governments, a topic addressed more or less separately by Bravo Lira at the
end of his work on this topic (Bravo, 1992).
Despite a consensus on the history of Latin American constitutionalism,
concern about the region's constitutional order and the promotion of
democracy is not new (Gonzalez, 2003). By 1952, Jesus de Galindez was able

to trace constitutional instability in the region from the independence period
to the date of his study. Noting a brief respite from new constitutions in
Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico during the second half of the

nineteenth century as exceptions to a continuous state of flux, De Galindez
found that most countries in the region during the twentieth century began
again repeatedly to enact new constitutions (De Galindez, 1952). This, of

course, was coupled with many forms of political instability, autocratic or
military rule, and rapid turnover of governments (Bravo, 1992). By one
estimate, Bolivia experienced 200 coups in 155 years as a republic by the
year 1980 with concomitant constitutional flux (Rivera, 2009). Venezuela
has had over 25 constitutional texts since 1811 (Ayala & Casal, 2009). Some
countries had long periods of the same constitution in place, but most

constitutions were short-lived, and even where constitutions had long lives,
this fact alone reveals nothing of healthy functioning constitutional
governments (Bravo, 1992).
Writing in the early 1990s, Bravo Lira assessed Latin American
constitutionalism since 1920 as caught in an apparently endless cycle of
constitutionalism, anarchy, and militarism in which constitutional and
military governments shift back and forth (Bravo, 1992). "The fact is that for
more than a century and a half, there is hardly a year in which a civil
government is not replaced by a military one or vice versa in one of the
twenty Iberoamerican countries" (Bravo, 1992, p. 167). Bravo Lira finds
several causes for this "constant oscillation" (Bravo, 1992, p. 169). These
include, in his view, the attempt to instill foreign institutions through
constitutions that were not consistent with the region's historical development, the lack of a historical response to an oppressive metropol in the
colonial context which failed to lead to a desire for self-government, and the
rise of a new militarism seeking functioning governments in the face of civil
governments' perceived failures. The results are extra-parliamentary laws, the
subordination of the legislative to the executive, the shortening of legislative

sessions, the suspension of legislatures, and a decline in the value of elections.
Although Bravo Lira asserts the descriptive accuracy of this cycle and these
factors, he believes that it is possible to break the cycle (Bravo, 1992).
A more recent survey of the constitutional condition of South America
from 1975 to 2005 reveals that despite notable progress, difficulties remain
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(Nogueira Alcala, 2009a). The situation is well known, and few examples are
sufficient. The successful and failed unconstitutional seizures of power by
the military through coups d'dtat were common in that period (Ayala
Casal, 2009; Carrasco, 2009; Garcia & Eguiguren, 2009; Ortiz, 2009; Rivera,
2009; Sagii6s. 2009; Salgado, 2009). Legislatures were closed by authoritarian or military order (Bravo, 1992). Military governments or strong
presidents used decree powers to enact laws often under the constitutional
cover of emergency powers (Bravo, 1992; Ortiz, 2009; Sagues, 2009).
Decrees might even serve to enact constitutional texts (Nogueira Alcala,
2009b). Authoritarian regimes operated with impunity, and sometimes with
subsequent full or partial immunity (Nogueira Alcala, 2009c; Sagues, 2009).
The judiciary and particularly members of the highest courts were subjected
to summary removal, replacement, and public distrust (Miller, 2000; Sagues,
2009). Constitutions continue to be subject to replacement or frequent
amendment on a political level (Ortiz, 2009).
Indeed, some scholars now write of "deconstitutionalization" in the
region meaning that unconstitutional laws are not challenged or laws needed
for the implementation or enforcement of constructional norms simply do

not exist (Reinaldo, 2009, pp. 64-74; Sagues, 2009, p. 59). Others have even
used the term "failed states" or the idea that constitutions may have lost
their significance at certain points in recent history (Ortiz, 2009, p. 215:

Salgado, 2009, pp. 418-419).
Can we really blame the Constitution of Cadiz for all this? Other students
of the region's constitutional history see countries' attempts to establish
more meaningful constitutional regimes as challenged by their constitutional
past (Rivera, 2009). For example, concerning the back and forth swings
between civil and military rules in the region, Bravo Lira writes, "[t]he point

of departure for the coming and going in Iberoamerica, and also in
the Iberian peninsula, of civil government to military government, is the
political vacuum created by the collapse of the enlightened monarchy at the
beginning of the nineteenth century" (Bravo, 1992, p. 195). The resulting
constitutionalism was, in Bravo Lira's view, "foreign [and] difficult to adapt
to these countries" (Bravo, 1992, p. 195). Thus, "historically, militarism is
born in Iberoamerica in conjunction with constitutionalism as a result of its

failures" (Bravo. 1992, p. 221).
The origins of present-day challenges to Latin American constitutionalism can be seen in the Constitution of Cadiz and its subsequent history in
the region. The Constitution of Cadiz failed to take root in any meaningful
way because of its immediate repeal by Fernando VII in 1814, and because
by 1820, Latin American countries were already well on the road to
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independence. The pattern for Latin American constitutionalism was
initiated.
Following the work of Schor, the Latin American experience with the
Constitution of Cadiz provides, perhaps, the first important regional
experience of a lack of "constitutional entrenchment" (Schor, 2006,
pp. 27-34). The inability of the Constitution of Cadiz to attain any manner
of entrenchment led to the constitutionally debilitating conclusion that
constitutional politics were coextensive with ordinary politics, a lasting
characteristic of Latin American constitutionalism (Schor, 2006). The
Constitution of Cadiz also served to establish the idea of the malleability of
constitutions in the face of political change: as Schor writes "[tlhere was
little reason for citizens to become wedded to rules that could be readily
changed at the behest of their rulers" (Schor, 2006, p. 7). Fernando VII said
a few words, and the document his defenders so ardently created to support

him disappeared. A few years later, with the shift of political tides, it was
back again. After less than two years, repealed. This social understanding of
constitutionalism has been matched with the frequent replacement of
constitutions on the level of regular politics in the region (Schor, 2006).
Fernando VII taught his American subjects all they would need to know
about constitutions for centuries to come.
The Constitution of Cadiz was not the only Latin American constitution
to go into and out of effect due to political shifts. On November 27, 1811, the

congress of New Granada (Colombia) enacted the Act of Federation of the
United Provinces of New Granada, and the federal provinces also drafted
their own constitutions over the next couple of years. The autonomous
Venezuelan Congress drafted a constitution on December 21, 1811. The
autonomous congress of Quito enacted a Solemn Pact of Association on

February 12, 1812, that shared much in spirit with the Constitution of Cadiz
(Rodriguez, 1998). These constitutions of early independence movements in
Latin America suffered similar fates as Spain regained control and the
nascent constitutional republics dissolved. Again, the lesson was learned that
constitutions were subject to political power and the ordinary course of
political and military actions. The Mexican Congress's decision in 1822 that
its determination concerning the appointment of judges would govern
despite the inconsistency with the Constitution of Cadiz is another example
of failing to establish constitutional law above politics.
The success of independence movements was the result of military might,
and strong generals led to the rise of military leaders. Thus, according to
Rodriguez, in northern South America, "men of arms dominated men of
law" (Rodriguez, 1998, pp. 240, 243). The strong executive and lifetime
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presidency created under the Bolivar's Constitution for Bolivia in 1826, for
example, share little in common with the legislatively strong provisions of
the Constitution of Cadiz (Rodriguez, 1998). In populations accustomed to
the ordinary politics of constitutions through the Cadiz experience, the path
toward caudillism, presidentialism, autocracy, and indeed military rule was
already being cleared.
The Constitution of Cadiz of 1812 was never in force for more than three
consecutive years in Spain or its colonies. The provisions of the Constitution
of Cadiz never formed an effective, lasting constitutional order in Spain or
Latin America. The constitution's immediate suspension and lack of longstanding force left fundamental fissures in Latin American constitutionalism
from which the region still suffers. By linking constitutions to political
change, the suspension of the Constitution of Cadiz politicized constitutional law and constitutionalism. In other words, constitutions became part
of the tool bag employed by politicians to bring political change, reform, or
restoration. This hindered the ability of constitutions to transcend the
political sphere in Latin America and led to patterns and difficulties found
in modern Latin American constitutionalism.
The Constitution of Cadiz heralded liberal constitutionalism in Europe
and Latin America. Its provisions shaped constitutions that were to come
after it. It served as a model for structuring elections not only for Spain but
also for several countries in Latin America, even after their independence

from Spain. Experience in Cadiz and at the Cortes contributed to the
political and constitutional savvy of constitutional drafters in America. The
Constitution of Cadiz can be properly viewed as an important document in
the history of national sovereignty, popular representation, liberal
constitutionalism, constitutional rights, and Latin American independence.
The use of historical justification in the debates of its drafters is noteworthy.
The immediate repeal of the Constitution of Cadiz and its resultant lack
of entrenchment established a pattern detrimental to effective and lasting
constitutionalism in Latin America. The Constitution of Cadiz and its
subsequent history can be seen as the origin of many of the constitutional
challenges facing the region today. In abolishing the Constitution of Cidiz
and the work of the Cortes, Fernando VII sent a message that had lasting

constitutional implications. His actions demonstrated that there was
nothing special about the Constitution of Cadiz, constitutions, or
constitutional laws. It was, unfortunately, a lesson learned. Such practices
and messages would be repeated over and over again in the region. To the

detriment of constitutional stability and lasting effective constitutionalism,
Latin America had made sense of this past.
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